DOE's "Path Forward " for Implementing EEOICPA Strengths and Weaknesses: A Preliminary Analysis
Prepared by
The Government Accountability Project (GAP) and
Alliance of Nuclear Workers Advocacy Groups (ANWAG)
February 25, 2004
DOE issued "EEOICPA Part D Path Forward" on February 12, 2004, which
outlines DOE's "plan" to eliminate its current caseload of 22,000+ claims
filed with the department under Subtitle D of EEOICPA. This plan is intended to
justify DOE's $33 million reprogramming request to increase its FY 04 funding
from $26 million to $59 million, and to secure $42 million in appropriations in
FY 05. Total proposed funding for FY 04 + FY 05 is $111 million on claims
processing only. Although $20+ million has been paid for claims processing so
far, we are not aware of any claims being paid to any of the 95 claimants with
positive physician panel determinations.
DOE has processed 217 (<1%) of the 22,000+ claims through its physicians panels since the DOE's Physicians Panel rule (10 CFR Part 851) was published in August 2002. This works out to approximately 3 claims per week. DOE projects its will process 15,000 claims through its physicians panels in FY 05, or 300 claims per week. To date, DOE's performance pales against the claims processing systems operated by the 50 states and the Department of Labor-all of which have larger annual caseloads than DOE's 22,000 claims. The General Accounting Office (GAO) is now evaluating the potential effectiveness of DOE's plan.
Background
The "Fernald" Ohio model is the basis for using a Physicians Panel as a means for determining whether a claim for occupational illness should be deemed to arise from occupational exposure to toxic substances. In the Fernald model, intensive case preparation precedes physician panel reviews. Case preparation includes use of a site profile (a job-exposure matrix which combines an extensive review of industrial hygiene data, radiation exposure data and occupational histories). This voluminous material is distilled and extracted into a set of "agreed facts," which, once assembled into an indexed binder, serves as the backbone for the three-physician panel to render an efficient decision. While this process is work intensive on the front end, it reduces demand for physician hours and provides a scientific basis for credible decisions, which are consistent from claim to claim. It allows common types of cases to be processed in a wholesale, rather than retail, manner.
Key elements in DOE's Plan
Key elements missing from DOE's plan
Plan Strengths
Physician payment levels must be increased. Lifting the current statutory cap on physicians pay ($68 per hour) merits approval, inasmuch as it is too low to attract occupational physicians who operate clinical practices. NIOSH has appointed approximately 140 physicians with occupational medicine expertise to serve on physicians panels so far. The pool of physicians must be expanded to increase throughput. DOE was slow to propose this simple reform despite the fact that DOE staff and the DOE's (now abolished) Worker Advocacy Advisory Board (WAAC) identified this as a problem needing a remedy in 2002. Members of Congress proposed that this payment "cap" be eliminated a year ago in the Reform of Energy Worker Compensation Act (HR 1758). The Grassley-Murkowski amendment to the FY 04 Energy & Water Appropriations Act proposed this change in September 2003. DOE only proposed it in 2004.
Plan Weaknesses
Having no site profiles compromises the quality of Physicians Panel findings. DOE's plan is bed rocked on a $111 million two-year investment in a system that will not meet the basic Congressional intent of producing high quality and credible physician panel decisions. A Physicians Panel finding is worthless without the science to back it up. This science must consist of a site profile, probable pathways of exposure, and occupational medical expertise. Site profiles form the foundation for determining workers exposures. This is imperative because there is little individual toxic exposure monitoring in DOE. Even though Secretary Abraham committed to Congress in 2003 that DOE would develop "site profiles" as a means to process 100 claims per week through the physicians panels, DOE has no scope, schedule or budget in its plan to develop and complete site profiles of toxic substance exposures. While NIOSH is compiling radiological site profiles to assist in dose reconstruction, DOE is not conducting comparable assessments. Absent adequate exposure analysis, decisions will, by necessity, be biased against the very claimants that Congress wanted DOE to assist. No site profiles have been completed as of February 2004.
Site Profiles Will Boost Efficiency. Physicians report that they
sometimes receive 200-1500 pages of documents, which are not indexed, and they
must dig through this chaotic pile of documents in search of answers-which may
or may not be there. With a site profile in hand, DOE can do far
more to increase efficiency in processing claims through the Physicians Panel
than it will ever accomplish through proposed changes to its rules. Site profiles
allow certain types of claims to be processed wholesale, rather than on a
retail basis (i.e. building or workgroup or job title). During 2003
budget briefings, Assistant Secretary Cook committed to site profiles, which
she said would allow claims to speed like a "snowball rolling down
hill." This was seen as a credible step, because it would allow
physicians to have a concise information resource from which they can quickly
extract necessary information without having to pour through thousands of pages
of documents. As late as July 2003, Under Secretary Card advised Congress
that site profiles would be forthcoming.
DOE has changed it stories several times since then.
First, DOE said they were working on these site profiles. Then they said it is
impossible to do them. Now DOE says they have "done what they are going to
do," and they refer to "site analyses" which describe the
history of a DOE site, but this "site analysis" does not identify
hazards by building, process and time frames in the kind of "job-exposure
matrix" that is used in industrial hygiene and epidemiology. DOE
received offers from industrial hygienists in its Former Worker Medical
Screening Programs to develop site profiles. These offers were rejected.
DOE has provided no justification for reversing course on site profiles.
Meanwhile, DOE has squandered time in which these could have been completed,
leading to more delays. NIOSH has decided they cannot process their large
volume of claims without site
profiles. For many sites, there is no
willing payor. DOE's plan contains no means for assuring payment of
claims, despite the fact that as many as 40% of the valid claims may not have a
" willing payor." Claimants in Iowa, Kentucky, Alaska, Missouri,
Colorado, Ohio, as well as some in New Mexico, Idaho and Nevada lack a willing
payor. A willing payor is an entity that DOE can meaningfully direct not to
contest a claim after a positive physicians panel determination has been
issued. DOE has proposed to have the National Academy of Social Insurance
(NASI) or the NAS study the size of the willing payor problem and compare
benefits.
The DOE Plan for more studies is a delay tactic. This proposed
study by NASI is a delay tactic to avoid paying valid claims. Today, there are
claimants who have received a positive physicians panel determination, but they
are left to defend themselves from attacks by insurance. DOE already
knows that certain workers who have a valid claim will not be compensated under
their state workers' compensation system, at least not without a major legal
battle.
Even though DOE's Advisory Committee warned DOE loudly in August 2001, DOE's
2004 plan labels this an "emergent" issue. In 2002, the
House Energy & Commerce Committee asked DOE to identify where it lacked
willing payors. In June 2002, DOE said
it was working on an analysis and would provide it in the near future. The
Committee received no follow-on analysis. In 2003, Congress again asked DOE to
define the scope and offer solutions to the willing payor problem. In
December 2002, Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp proposed that DOE contract with
Ohio's exclusive state fund, if DOE would reimburse its costs. DOE rejected
this approach, and offered no alternative. One DOE contractor tried to set up a
third party administrator for the past two years, but this is not workable. GAO
is also due to report to Congress on the willing payor problem. The
National Economic Council published a study in March 2000, which evaluated the
suitability of state worker compensation systems for compensating occupational
illnesses at DOE sites, and concluded it would be better to establish a federal
system. Despite extensive evaluations, DOE is delaying action with yet another
study.
Offering claimants hope with a positive panel finding, but offering no way
to assure payment is cruel. This must be remedied through legislation, not
more studies.
Solution
Congress should have DOL be the administrator of the program. DOE should agree to make the DOL the administrator of benefits, including evaluating disability levels and serving as the willing payor. HR 1758 proposes to make DOL the willing payor. S. 3058, introduced in the 107th Congress, also makes DOL the willing payor. DOL has the expertise to serve as the willing payor, as it operates 4 compensation programs.
DOE's plan does nothing to close the expertise gap. DOE hired a
support service contractor-- Science and Engineering Associates (SEA) in 2001
through an interagency agreement with the Navy to process claims, even though
this contractor has not run a claims program before. The contractor put
together a system, which, according to the Hays Group (DOE's consultant to
evaluate their program), suffers from "design flaws."
Performance to date reveals questionable expertise in running a claims
processing system. DOE claims it is
going to overcome this expertise gap forming a "Tiger Team" with the
Labor Department, but this team will only be reviewing and advising on new
procedures. Based on the Hays Group's report and this constellation of
knowledge, DOE is requesting $111 million over the next two years to work off
the caseload. DOE should consider an interagency agreement with the DOL, which
has a system to process hundreds of thousands of claims per year.
The plan fails to consider the excessive costs charged by SEA. SEA
has been charging the Energy Department 2.5 times the hourly rate (fully
loaded) compared with comparable federal employees (GS-11 or GS-12) who perform
identical claims processing work in the Labor Department. In sum, DOL can
process claims for less than half the cost of DOE, based on a review of SEA's
costs for this contract.
DOE's plan entails significant risk of failure. DOE is planning to
scale up a system that has not been demonstrated to be effective at its current
level of operations. Many of the positive physician panel determinations have
involved claims previously adjudicated by the Department of Labor, thus DOE's
projections are not based on a sufficiently representative sample of claims.
DOE's plan to separate cases into those who are living versus survivors may
have merit, but no analysis has been presented.
A Worker Compensation Assistance Advisory Committee (WAAC) will be
formed. With DOE facing pointed
criticism from Congress, the GAO, and claimants, DOE is seeking to rebuild
"stakeholder support" for a program that has lost legitimacy. DOE
intends to establish a new Advisory Committee to replace the expert Advisory
Committee it abolished 14 months ago. The previous Board of nationally
recognized experts offered suggestions on the willing payor problem and
avoiding a case backlog. Meetings with insurance companies and
contractors on the willing payor problem were actively underway when the
Charter was allowed to expire. The Committee's recommendations were viewed as
criticisms by DOE, and were largely ignored. A new Advisory Committee
coming at this late date appears to be little more than window dressing on a
failing program.
DOE misunderstands the EEOICPA. DOE asserts in its plan that it
was DOE Secretary Abraham who decided that the DOE contractors will not be
allowed to contest claims approved by Physicians Panels, and that the Secretary
alone decided that DOE would reimburse contractors for the costs of paying
claims with positive determinations. DOE is a misreading the law.
EEOICPA specifically states that DOE may not contest workers compensation
claims that are approved by Physicians Panels. This is a minimum statutory
requirement. Further, DOE has not ordered reimbursement of contractor costs
for claims. Rather such payments are, by the terms of DOE's physicians
panel rule, strictly dependent on the terms of DOE's contracts with its
contractors. DOE's apparent misunderstanding of this legislation puzzles us.
Conclusions
We recommend that Congress ask GAO and the Department of Labor whether DOE has
offered a believable plan which: (1) assures that workers made sick in DOE's
weapons factories will get a scientifically credible Physicians Panel
determination, (2) whether compensation that is due will be paid and that no
one is left without a willing payor, and (3) whether there is a reasonable
basis for DOE's claims processing projections.
Congress needs to examine whether there are more cost-effective and efficient
alternatives to DOE's plan. Congress should consider one well-tested
alternative: using the DOL for claims processing, managing physicians panels
and serving as the willing payor, while assigning DOE to secure the records (as
it does today under Subtitle B for NIOSH and DOL). Unlike DOE, DOL is well
qualified. Moreover, DOL offers substantial cost efficiencies, inasmuch as 95%
of DOE claims backlog overlaps with claims already processed by the DOL. DOL
has already started claims development work that DOE is planning to replicate. Further,
claims processing costs are 50% lower at the DOL than at the DOE, due to the
high rates charged by SEA under its Blanket Purchase Order.
For more information, please contact: Richard Miller, 202-408-0034 extension
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